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Abstract 
The Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN) manages 
the Common GST Electronic Portal. The payment of 
money, inclusive of the Goods and Services Taxes (GSTs), 
is made to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in three 
different ways – It can first be deposited as revenue in 
compliance with law; it can also be deposited after 
collection, following notices of demand; and finally it can 
be deposited after recovery from defaulters, into the 
respective Consolidated Funds, which are mutually 
independent parts of central and state treasuries. GST 
revenues accounted for in the Consolidated Funds would 
have to be correct, complete and uncontested. The GSTN 
thereafter manages the digital facilitation of the 
registration, furnishing returns, computation and 
settlement of Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST), 
electronic way bill and other functions if prescribed in 
accordance with law. This paper examines if the 
functioning of the GSTN within the framework of the 
Constitution, would enable the State to apply the 
Directive Principles of State Policy, which guide 
governance in India, to secure and preserve a just social 
order. 
Keywords: Algorithms, Article 279A, Constitution, Good 
Governance, Institutions of National Life 
1. Introduction 
The reformulation of State Policy relating to the mode of levy and 
collection of Central and State indirect taxes has been facilitated by 
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the amendment of the Constitution in 2016. Section 146 of the 
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 20171 which came into force in 
April 2017, provides for the notification of a common portal in 
accordance with the recommendations of the GST Council, which 
states that: “The Government may, on the recommendations of the 
Council, notify the Common Goods and Services Tax Electronic 
Portal for facilitating registration, payment of tax, furnishing of 
returns, computation and settlement of integrated tax, electronic 
way bill and for carrying out such other functions and for such 
purposes as may be prescribed.”2 The common portal was notified 
in the Government of India’s Ministry of Finance Notification 
4/20173, dated 19 June 2017 as ‘www.gst.gov.in’, coming into effect 
from the 22nd of June, 2017.  
The portal is to be managed by the Goods and Services Tax 
Network (GSTN), which is a not-for-profit private company, 
incorporated as early as on the 28th of March, 2013, and is deemed 
to be licensed under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 20134. GSTN 
has thus been co-opted by the State to perform certain public 
functions. In the absence of a common procedural law, this has 
been reinforced through similar notifications published 
independently by every State Government, by invoking a similar 
provision enacted in the respective State GST statute.5 
It is unclear if the Constitution of India, as amended in 2016, could 
have envisaged a Common Electronic Portal for any other purpose, 
apart from the support of the provisions relating to the treasuries 
enacted in it. The mandate of the GST Council is defined in clauses 
(4) and (5) of Article 279A. The said mandate is subject to 
constitutional guidance, adhering to the multi-faceted norm of 
harmony, which includes harmony in transiting from pre-GST 
                                                          
1 §146, The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, No. 10 of 2017, INDIA 
CODE (2017), http://gstcouncil.gov.in/meetings  
2 INDIA CONST. art. 279A, cl. (1) 
3 G.S.R. 606(E), Central Goods and Service Tax, Ministry of Finance, 
Notification No. 4/2017 
4 §8, Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013) 
5  Government of Andhra Pradesh GO MS No.225, 22 June 2017, 
https://www.apct.gov.in/gstportal/GST_Portal/table_rn.aspx?uid=Ta
x+Notification 




regimes to GST regimes. The mandate of the GST Council is 
defined in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 279A without jeopardizing 
their respective fiscal interests.  Since there is no specific reference 
to a common electronic portal in sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (4) 
of Article 279A6, it would be appropriate to assume that the 
notifications of such portal, independently by the Union and every 
State, was one of the other matters relating to goods and service tax 
referred to in sub-clause (h) of clause (4) of the aforementioned 
Article. Since sub-clause (c) of clause (4) of Article 279A refers to 
Article 269A7 (which in turn refers to the Consolidated Funds in 
sub-clauses (2), (3) and (4) of that Article), it can be argued that the 
notification of the common electronic portal is related to the 
provision in sub-clause (c) of clause (4) of Article 279A. This 
specific clause refers to the apportionment of Goods and Services 
Tax levied on supplies in the course of interstate trade or commerce 
(i.e., Integrated Goods and Services Tax) under Article 269A, and as 
such, to the Model GST laws referred to in the same sub-clause and 
implicitly to the treasuries to which the Consolidated Funds 
belong.  
The article shall, therefore, examine the role of the GSTN in 
enabling the State to comply with its Constitutional Duty. Firstly, 
the article shall discuss the machine-learning algorithms which 
would have to be used for management of its functions by GSTN, 
in support of good governance. The article will then proceed to 
explain the screening algorithms which would have to be utilized 
by the GSTN to manage the production of the deliverables in the 
form of information or evidence. The algorithms would first be 
employed by the central and state GST jurisdictional authorities, in 
support of their respective judgments and secondly to other 
relevant public authorities (including income tax authorities) so as 
to enforce law, in support of the exercise of their powers within 
their respective jurisdictions. It would lastly be used by the 
Governments in monitoring the implementation of State Policy. 
                                                          
6  See INDIA CONST. art. 279A, cl. (4); K. Sethuraman Levy of Goods and 
Services Tax: When and Where of Taxable Events, https://business-of-
government.com/rev-1levy-of-goods-and-services-tax when-and-where-
of-taxable-events/ 
7 INDIA CONST., art. 269A, cl. (4)(c) 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 9, No.2                                 ISSN 2278-4322 
22 
 
Finally, the article concludes on the extent to which GSTN would 
be able to provide support to the State, in complying with the 
stipulations made in Article 378. It points out the need for further 
reforms in securing and protecting a just social order, as stipulated 
in Article 389. This will be done while sub-serving common good 
and avoiding common detriment of the nature referred to in Article 
39.10 
2. Algorithms Needed in Support of Good Governance 
The terms of the contract if any, between the Central Government 
and the State Governments, with regards to the GSTN are not in 
the public realm. It is thus not evident if the GSTN is constrained in 
hiring personnel based on the requirement that every employee of 
the GSTN would have to affirm or swear allegiance to the 
Constitution of India. It can therefore be assumed that the GSTN is 
a public authority embedded in the State.  
It is important to understand the role of the GSTN as an agency of 
the State, managing the common portal, in the context of 
governance, in accordance with the rule of law, with the intention 
to secure justice. While the GSTN is expected to act using 
algorithms, it is important to keep in mind the following caution 
stated in Kleinberg et al.11  “Algorithms change the landscape… 
they do not eliminate the problem”. The “problem” in the context 
of the stipulations made in Articles 38 and 39 is to secure and 
protect a just social order, while simultaneously allocating the 
resources of the fraternal community of Indians for best use. In 
doing so, the subservience of the common good and the avoidance 
of every common detriment of the nature referred to in Article 39, 
is made easier for the process of accumulating capital. 
                                                          
8 INDIA CONST., art. 37  
9 INDIA CONST., art. 38 
10 INDIA CONST., art. 39 
11 Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, Cass R. Sunstein, 
Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms http//www.nber.org/ papers/ 
w25548 




2.1 Enabling a ‘Just’ Environment for the Institutions of National 
Life 
 In order to secure and protect a ‘just’ social order as stipulated in 
Article 38, the State would first have to enable a ‘just’ environment 
for the functioning of other ‘institutions of national life’12. The first 
institution would be that of the Market. The ability of the Market to 
enable such an environment hinges on the performance of two 
functions – Firstly, it would have to discover from time to time, the 
equilibrium prices of goods and services, by balancing the demand 
for and the supply of commodities13 at the national level, without 
the market participants being legally constrained to classify 
transactions, with reference to sub-national borders, as done14 in 
1956 and 2017. Secondly, the Market must function in an open 
economy, duly respecting the equilibrium prevailing in the world 
market, and the consequent fob and cif values of specific 
goods/services, which prevail from time to time in India’s customs 
frontiers.15 
The second institution is that of Property Rights, which recognizes 
the respective scope (net worth) of the rights of every individual 
person and organization over well-specified parts of the wealth of 
the nation.16 Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction. They reduce uncertainty in providing a 
structure to everyday life.17 In drafting Article 38, the Constituent 
Assembly had been far-sighted in 1950, in recognizing the role of 
the institutions in minimizing uncertainty (as observed later by 
North) regarding the Article’s goal of welfare.  
                                                          
12 INDIA CONST., art. 38 
13 Gerard Debreu, The Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of 
Economic Equilibrium, 2 (1959) 
14 The Central Sales Tax Act,1956 https:// indiacode.nic.in/ handle/ 
123456789/2484?sam_handle=123456789/1362 
15 Incoterm 2020, International Chamber of Commerce, https:// 
iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/incoterms-rules/incoterms-2020/ 
16 Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 3 (1997) 
17Douglass C North, Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, 1, 1990. 
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2.2 Redesigning the Economic Mechanism for Market 
Participation 
Securing and protecting the just social order would then lead the 
State to redesign the economic mechanism (also referred to as game 
form) that constrains the functioning of the Market. This would be 
so in case of law made to levy taxes. Significant changes to the 
design of the economic mechanism can be brought about by the 
restructuring of procedural law. This would involve regulating the 
compliance and administration of the Central and State statutes 
that levy indirect taxes on the values of the supplies of goods and 
services, and collecting them on a value-added basis. Every such 
mechanism would stipulate the rules of the game for the potential 
participants embedded in the institution of the Market, to take their 
respective private decentralized binary decisions on participating 
in specific transactions. 
The concept of value of the actions of the market participants, 
relative to a price system is explained by Gerard Debreu. In 
Chapter 6 of his book18, he goes on to prove two essential theorems 
of the theory of value:  
(i) Under some assumptions, if an attainable state of the 
economy is in equilibrium relative to a price system, that 
state is in an optimum condition.  
(ii) Conversely, under some assumptions, if an attainable state 
of the economy is in an optimum state, there is a price 
system relative to which that state is in equilibrium. 
Here, while the concept of optimum relates to efficiency, the 
concept of equilibrium relates to harmony and justice. As for 
equilibrium, given a price system, an attainable state of the 
economy is assumed to be in equilibrium, relative to the price 
system, if no consumer can satisfy his preferences better without 
increasing his expenditure and if no producer can increase his 
profits. Subject to the prevailing cif and fob prices at the customs 
frontiers, it is logical to relate the ideal of equilibrium to the ideal of 
‘harmonized national market for goods and services’ stipulated in 
                                                          
18 Supra Deubreu at 33 




clause (6) of Article 279A19 ,as constitutional guidance to the GST 
Council. 
Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter note20 that legislation can 
define socio-economic or politico-economic goals. A socio-
economic goal may be ‘welfare’, subject to a ‘just’ social order as 
stipulated in Article 3821, enacted in Part IV of the Constitution. The 
politico-economic goal, which could be the avoidance of loss of 
indirect tax revenues to the Union and the States in transiting from 
pre-GST to GST regimes, may at best be just a means to the goal 
and not a goal as such. This is stipulated in Part IV of the 
Constitution. The law made, represents a machine producing a 
non-deterministic algorithm, for binary participation decisions by 
economic agents. 
2.3 Harmony in the Economy and Clearing House role of the 
Common Portal 
The State must now define the economy22 as the flow of 
expenditures to secure values of goods and services in the paths 
and cycles of the market network. It must also harmoniously 
balance the flow of incomes received by it. Rakesh Vohra explains23 
the idea of a network through his exposition about the 
decomposition of the flow of the values of goods and/or services 
into “path” and “cycle” flows. This would be especially relevant for 
the management of the common portal by a clearing house. Clearing 
houses assist in identifying suspect transactions, enabling a subset 
of suppliers to falsely claim, helping others claim losses or business 
expenses in computing their respective income tax liabilities and to 
vanish from the Market, beyond the reach of the GST authorities. 
While arbitrary acts of GST authorities ought to be discouraged, 
strict enforcement of tax laws in a given case, is to be created as a 
                                                          
19 INDIA CONST., art. 279A 
20 Leonard Herwicz, Stanley Reiker, Designing Economic Mechanisms, 4 
(2006) 
21 INDIA CONST., art. 38 
22 R.A. Musgrave, P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 
221 (1984). 
23 Rakesh Vohra, Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach, 3 
(2011). 
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measure of justice to all taxpayers who comply with tax law 
honestly and not merely as a greedy act to somehow protect the 
central and state Governments’ interests in accumulating tax 
revenues. 
The economic impact on every final domestic consumer would 
include the shifting of indirect taxes onto them and the incidence of 
income transfers by way of profits earned through their respective 
margins, by suppliers linked to them in the market network. Unless 
every supplier (irrespective of their registration status) is required 
by law to perform a public act to create documentary evidence in a 
manner stipulated by law,  every business-to-business and 
business-to-consumer transaction resulting in the supply of goods 
and/or services, the respective flows of income and of the values of 
goods and services in the economy, cannot be captured in full, in 
order to ascertain if the flows balance themselves harmoniously, as 
stipulated in clause (6) of Article 279A of the Constitution. 
In the case of the stand-alone reform in the manner of levy and 
collection of indirect taxes, unrelated to the manner of levying and 
collecting income taxes and regulating access to rebates and/or 
subsidies, it may be necessary to provide for registration. It is 
necessary, for various practical reasons, that small suppliers be 
exempted from registration and small registered suppliers be 
exempted from furnishing periodical returns. It is however, 
important to provide for appropriate incentives for the creation of a 
supply voucher,24 which the public authorities in every State and 
Union Territory throughout India, may presume to be evidence of 
every aspect of supply. This includes the identities of parties to, 
and the amount of monetary consideration for the contract 
underlying the supply (whether or not the amounts of various 
applicable GSTs are shown separately therein). This would have to 
be ensured through governance protocols for exempting small 
suppliers from registration and exempting registered small 
suppliers from the obligation to furnish periodical returns.  
Facilitating the digital governance of the central and state GST 
regimes must also be done by State, where the manager of the 
                                                          
24 INDIA CONST., art. 261 




Portal would have to rely on a Centre-State bureaucratic legal 
hierarchy. This would be possible by the creative use of Articles 
25825 and 258A26 enacted in Chapter II on Administrative Relations 
in Part XI, dealing with Union-State Relations. Such use would 
facilitate the creation of Centre-State territorial and functional legal 
jurisdictions across the administrative divide, between the Union 
and every State, as discernible from Articles 73 and 162.  
2.4 Screening Algorithms to facilitate Good Governance 
The screening algorithms27 relevant to the governance of the levy 
and collection of central and state GSTs and used by the clearing 
house would have to accord with the algorithms needed for good 
governance, in support of the rule of law. As for screening data, 
Kleinberg et al. observes: “We often refer to anything that involves 
data and the resulting prediction as an algorithm. But… this misses 
the fact that there are actually two separate algorithms in any 
screening rule application.”28 They designate one algorithm as a 
screener, which when related to the indirect tax reform of 2017, 
takes the characteristics of an individual, such as a supply being 
vouched, and reports back an outcome. An example of this would 
be as to whether or not the supply vouched was in fact the supply 
made by an identifiable supplier to an identifiable recipient and if it 
was so made, whether it was in the path of the supply network 
relating to a specific good or a specific service or in a cycle. They 
characterize the underlying algorithm as the trainer, which is the 
code that produces the screening algorithm. They note that this 
trainer algorithm includes deciding which past cases to assemble 
for use, in predicting outcomes for some set of current cases, what 
outcome to predict, and which all candidates to consider29. 
The manner of truthfully documenting every supply of goods 
and/or services, in accordance with the law laid down in Article 
261, is likely to generate big data, which can be mined for many 
useful policy and governance purposes. This includes accurate 
                                                          
25 INDIA CONST., art. 258 
26 INDIA CONST., art. 258A 
27 Supra Kleinberg at 16  
28 Id. 
29 Id 
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assessment of taxes on incomes from businesses and professions, 
well beyond the mere oversight of the accurate assessment and 
collection of central and state GSTs due and payable. Taking the 
wealth of the nation as a resource of the community of Indian 
nationals30and the national income on which tax due has been paid 
by the respective earners of agricultural and other income, as the 
legal means for capital accumulation31, good governance would 
have to rely on two things:  
a) A legally constituted National Tax Authority which would 
have to continuously gather commercial intelligence to 
monitor and publicly notify from time to time about the cif 
and fob unit values of every specific good and service, 
which in its judgment is likely to prevail at the customs 
frontier of India. They also exist to provide authoritative 
and well-considered uniform advance rulings to 
entrepreneurs intending to participate in specific but 
unusual market transactions; and to regulate and oversee 
the administration of, and compliance with, all central and 
state direct and indirect tax statutes; and  
b) A legally constituted clearing house for information 
relevant to compliance and administration under the 
control of such authority, to enable legal and administrative 
entities in decision making by relying on information and 
evidence discernible from the digital outputs from such 
clearing house. 
2.5 IGST, Seamless Input GST credits and Alternatives for 
simpler GST law  
Finally, and alternatively, the GST law would be simpler to comply 
with and to administer, if instead of enacting identical provisions to 
regulate procedure in multiple central and state statutes, and 
relying on the instrument of Integrated Goods and Services Tax 
(IGST) as the pivot of the reform, the Constitution is amended to 
provide for Entries in the Concurrent List. The amendment would 
firstly include the establishment of a National Tax Authority. The 
                                                          
30 INDIA CONST., art. 39, cl. (b) 
31 INDIA CONST., art. 39, cl. (c) 




body would oversee the governance of all the central and state 
direct and indirect taxes, including central GST. It would also 
oversee Union and state surcharge on business-to-consumer 
supplies and every state GST. It would secondly include a 
procedure for compliance with, and the administration of, central 
and state GSTs applicable in common in every State, subject only to 
very few possible local modifications, such as those made 
regarding civil and criminal procedure in the concurrent list.32 
No credit of any GST paid on inputs can be availed in computing 
the GSTs payable by a person out of the GSTs due, unless the input 
GSTs are deposited in the respective Consolidated Funds.  
Seamless input GST credits across the Centre-State administrative 
divide would have to rely on appropriations validly charged on the 
relevant Consolidated Funds, by competent Legislatures. The 
Parliament is not authorized by Constitution to appropriate money 
from the Consolidated Fund of any State and no State Legislature is 
authorized to appropriate money from the Consolidated Fund of 
India.33 
3. Revelation Principle and ‘The State’ as a Mediator 
Ensuring Harmony 
The governance of the levy and collection of the central and state 
GSTs would have to be by the State, duly applying the principle 
stipulated in Article 38, for securing and protecting a just social 
order in, which the institutions of the Market and property rights 
are not impeded from functioning as institutions of national life. If 
such governance is to derive meaningful digital support from an 
official clearing house, such as a common portal, such support 
would have to rely on appropriate algorithms, to screen every 
supply of goods and/or services. This would be so because ‘Goods 
and Services Tax’ as defined in Article 36634, with reference 
principally to the taxable event supply, is deliberately left open-
ended and undefined in Article 366.  
                                                          
32 INDIA CONST, List III, Entry 2, 13 
33 INDIA CONST art 114 cl (3), art 204 cl (3), 266 cl (3) 
34 INDIA CONST., art. 366 
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The screening algorithms would have to be identified with 
reference to other algorithms, which would make such screening 
relevant not only for compliance with, and the administration of 
law including the central and state GST statutes, but more 
fundamentally for compliance with constitutional stipulations as to 
good governance relating to –  
a) Allocation of the resources of the community of Indians so 
as to sub-serve the common good (i.e., constitutionally 
optimal allocation of resources for best use);  
b) Capital accumulation without causing any common 
detriment; and  
c) Securing and protecting justice in the nation; and 
d) The Constitutional Principles laid down in Article 38 and 39 
Let us take a recipient sourcing a supply as the Principal and a 
supplier as the Agent35. A contract underlies every supply. 
Typically, every contract may be affected by asymmetric 
information possessed by the parties to the contract36. Parties to a 
contract typically refrain from sharing private information. The 
private information possessed by an individual economic agent 
about their preferences, defines the ‘type’ of that agent. A function 
that maps types into social decisions and transfers is designated as 
a social choice function. A ‘mechanism’ is a specification of a 
message space for each individual and an outcome function that 
maps vectors of messages into social decisions and transfers. A 
strategy that is taken as the best, regardless of the strategies chosen 
by other economic agents, is called the ‘dominant strategy’. A 
‘direct mechanism’ is a mechanism in which the message space is 
the type space and outcome function is the social choice function. 
 Negotiation of the terms of contracts leading to supplies of goods 
and/or services may be affected by adverse selection. Governance 
of such contracts under execution may be affected by moral 
hazards. In the context of private and selective communication 
strategies pursued by economic agents as potential or actual market 
                                                          
35 Jean Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, Theory of Incentives, (2002). 
36 See Bolton and Dewatripont, Contract Theory (2005). 




participants, mechanism design literature refers to the revelation 
principle which states that if a social choice function can be 
implemented in dominant strategies by a mechanism, it can be 
truthfully implemented by a direct mechanism. Rakesh Vohra 
refers to the importance of the revelation principle by quoting 
Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson: 
In any economic institution, individuals must be 
given appropriate incentives to share private 
information or to exert unobserved efforts. The 
revelation principle is a technical insight that allows 
us to make general statements about what 
allocations are feasible, subject to incentive 
constraints, in economic problems with adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The revelation principle 
tells us that, for any general coordination 
mechanism, any equilibrium of communication 
strategies for the economic agents can be simulated 
by an equivalent incentive-compatible direct-
revelation mechanism, where a trustworthy 
mediator maximally centralizes communication and 
makes honesty and obedience rational equilibrium 
strategies for the agents. 37 
The State would have to be able to play the role of a trustworthy 
mediator, which maximally centralizes information contained in 
every supply voucher as presumptive evidence of such supply, 
recognizable as such in every State or Union Territory in India and 
elsewhere in the world. It would also centralize information 
otherwise ascertained by ‘ground-truthing’ efforts through 
compliance (such as special reporting requirements by some 
categories of suppliers like banks and carriers), enforcement, (such 
as physical inventory of goods at the place(s) of business) and/or 
by providing appropriate incentives to consumers. The harmonized 
structure of good and services, stipulated as a norm vide clause (6) 
of Article 279A, is to be realized from the equilibrium in the 
economy, which would logically be out of reach unless the State is 
able to play such a role. 
                                                          
37 Id. at 23 
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4. Securing and Protecting a Just Social Order 
The question to be answered now is whether the Goods and 
Services Tax Network (GSTN) manages the common portal, so as to 
fulfill such expectations. To begin with, it is important to note that 
the GSTN envisages its role in accordance with the system 
architecture which may be accessed in the Electronic Portal. From 
section 146 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, it is 
easy to see that the main role of GSTN would have to relate to the 
apportionment of Integrated Goods and Services Tax between the 
Union and the States. The devolution of IGST revenues to the 
destination States by way of apportionment, has been 
distinguished38 from devolution of central tax revenues by way of 
assignment.  It is noteworthy that GSTN somehow categorizes the 
role of settlement of IGST as non-statutory39. It stands to reason that 
if the July 2017 reform of State Policy had avoided relying on the 
legal instrument of IGST, there would have been no need for 
GSTN. The role of GSTN relating to the governance of registration, 
returns, payments and other functions if prescribed, would have to 
be subservient to its clearing house role, limited to merely the 
computation and settlement of integrated tax. Since the GST law 
does not unequivocally provide that every supply, including 
business-to-consumer supplies, would have to be documented by 
the issue of a true supply voucher, the role of GSTN does not 
include a role to confirm, if the particulars of every supply vouched 
by every supplier are true. Such larger role would indeed be the 
role envisaged by Myerson, of a trustworthy mediator, who 
maximally centralizes communication and makes honest and 
obedient rational equilibrium strategies for the economic agents.40 
The basic treasury function would be to ensure the completeness of 
the particulars of supplies of goods and/or services 
vouched/reported in, and the accuracy of the amounts of the 
applicable GSTs due and payable in every accounting period by 
                                                          
38 See K. Sethuraman, Constitutional Accountability for India's Goods and 
Services tax Revenues After the July 2017 Reform,4 Aarthika Charche No1, 
21, 34 
39 Id.  
40 Supra Vohra at 23 




every registered and other supplier, functioning from every 
place/principal place of business. In its territorial jurisdiction this 
function is that of every primary GST authority responsible for 
accurate assessment, collection and recovery. The function relating 
to accounting for GST revenues in every treasury is that of the 
Reserve Bank of India. There can be no treasury function other than 
assessment, collection, recovery and accounting. The common 
portal would have to be a facility in aid of the treasury functions 
and not merely in aid of registered suppliers.  
Preserving the privacy of the economic agents as potential or actual 
market participants implies an arm’s length relationship between 
every supplier and every primary Centre-State GST authority, 
within whose territorial jurisdiction the supplier adds value and/or 
otherwise functions by using one or more of places of business. It is 
therefore not appropriate for any public agency of the State, such as 
GSTN, to intervene legally, by matching the particulars relied upon 
by suppliers claiming input GST credits, and particulars reported 
by input suppliers, while the primary GST authorities and RBI 
perform their respective treasury functions. Digital evidence of the 
particulars, in case of mismatches of reported transactions would 
no doubt be the fodder for the assessments to the best of the 
judgments of the respective GST authorities. Evidence of matches 
would however be insufficient to conclude that the reported 
transactions did really take place. While trusting such evidence, it 
would be prudent for the GST authorities to verify the truth of the 
particulars of such matched transactions on the ground41. 
In such a legal environment, rule of law implies that the screening 
algorithms used by the manager of the common portal, would have 
to extend beyond the returns furnished by registered suppliers and 
include the particulars of every supply made by every supplier, 
regardless of whether they are registered or not exempted from 
furnishing returns. The particulars must include the codes which 
must be compatible with Harmonized System of Nomenclature of 
Goods and the United Nations Central Product Classification for 
                                                          
41 Daven R Desai, Joshua A Kroll, Trust, but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms 
and Law, 31 Harvard Journal Of Law And Technology 1, 64  
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every distinct good or service supplied. It must also include the 
true identities of the supplier and recipient related to the supply, 
the particulars of their respective places of business, and the related 
place of supply and the State or Union Territory in which such 
place of supply is situated. This would help the Government of 
India and every State Government, with information and evidence 
of the decomposition of the flows of the values of specific goods 
and services in the supply network, into path and cycle flows. It 
also helps them identify prima facie suspect transactions in the 
cycles, which add zero net value, and the particulars of the parties 
to such suspect transactions. The evidence so culled out by data 
analytics, would help relevant primary Centre-State GST 
authorities to proceed objectively to assess the GST dues relating to 
such suspect supplies to the best of their respective judgments. The 
evidence would also help the authorities assessing according to the 
best of their respective judgments, the amounts of the taxes due 
and payable on their incomes, from their respective businesses and 
professions, by the suppliers identified as linked to suspect 
transactions which lead, inter alia, to suspect claims of business 
expenses and losses. 
In the context of another public law relating to discrimination in 
employment, Kleinberg et al. refer to the following components in 
constructing a training algorithm:  
a) Collecting data sets  
b) Specifying a concrete outcome to be predicted in that 
dataset  
c) Deciding which candidate predictors to construct and make 
available to the algorithm to be considered for inclusion in 
the final statistical model 
d) Building a procedure for finding the best predictor which 
uses all the other variables to predict the outcome of 
interest; and 
e) Validating the procedure in a hold-out set (i.e., a dataset 
that was not used to train the algorithm on).42  
                                                          
42 Supra Kleinberg at 11 




The GST law, as enacted in July 2017, relies on the dataset defined 
by the data available in the returns furnished by a sub-set of 
suppliers, who happen to be registered. The outcome of interest to 
the July 2017 reform, is the computation and settlement of 
integrated tax among the Union and the States, and is not the good 
governance outcome of securing and protecting a fair choice 
architecture, for sourcing supplies of goods and/or services. The 
training algorithm constructed is also yet to be validated in a 
dataset, defined by the data contained in the true supply vouchers, 
which would have to be invariably demanded from, and issued by, 
registered and other suppliers, especially to consumers. 
5. Conclusion 
In order to implement the algorithm into the GSTN, there would 
have to be subsequent reform of State policy, beginning with the 
demand for and the issue of true supply vouchers to be printed by 
every supplier, for business-to-consumer supplies, without 
exception, in addition to printing and issuing of supply voucher for 
every business-to-business supply. The State would then have to 
implement special reporting requirements, on the part of specific 
categories of service providers, who intervene in facilitating other 
business-to-business and business-to-consumer supplies to be 
made or accounted for. Finally, the State must maximally centralize 
the information in order to lead to market participation, by every 
supplier and the corresponding recipient of business-to-business 
and business-to-consumer supply. This is done by uploading 
information disclosed in every such supply voucher and every 
special report from time to time, manually or electronically in a 
central database such as the common portal. The reforms must lead 
to the analysis of the big data discernible from such supply 
vouchers and special reports, in order to produce meaningful 
deliverables to the Central and State GST authorities, to aid their 
judgments. Unless there is such further reform, no manager of the 
common portal would be able to manage such portal with a view to 
enable the State to secure and protect a social order, in which 
justice as fairness prevails in the environments of the institutions of 
national life, including the Market and property rights.  
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There would no doubt be several technical challenges in 
implementing the State policy, subsequent to such reform. These 
would include the designing and making available desk-top and 
hand-held electronic equipment’s, as well as pre-identified 
stationary for printing and issue of supply vouchers and 
supporting telecommunication infrastructure. Ultimately, justice 
would have to be administered objectively by a legal hierarchy of 
the Central and State GST authorities, subject to the constitutional 
oversight of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. As Kleinberg 
et al. have pointed out: “It would be naïve, even dangerous, to 
conflate algorithmic with objective… A critical element of 
regulating algorithms is regulating humans”.43 In case of 
compliance with, and administration of the GST law, humans 
would include every value-adding or value-seeking market 
participant, as well as every tax administrator discharging their 
duty. 
Such a fair choice architecture would imply a just social order in 
which tax disputes would be minimized. The businesses of 
producers, traders, service providers and exporters would thrive 
and the consumers would be able to get fair value for the supplies 
needed by them. The buoyancy of GST revenues would also 
significantly exceed unity. If the GST law avoids any contrived 
definition of supply and allows the concept of value to be aligned 
as nearly as possible to the concept described in Debreu’s Theory of 
Value44, the allocation of the resources would also tend to be for 
best use in sub-serving the common good. Instead of a stand-alone 
reform limited to select indirect taxes, further reform based on 
better coordination of policy and action in enforcing non-GST law, 
especially law relating to taxes on agricultural and other incomes as 
well as the GST law, would avoid many a common detriment in the 
process of capital accumulation. 
                                                          
43 Id. 
44 Supra Debreu at 2 
